neoacidcreep

Sitting in-front of this blank screen, packing a single cigarette for an incredibly long time, taking long drags of my beer bottle, thinking about the vodka chilling in the freezer, trying to come up with some sort of introductory sentence to begin my latest of latest tirades; this will have to suffice.

Having a particularly beautiful Bukowskian day.  The sun irradiating my left half with it's thermo-nuclear reactions from millions of miles away makes ancient cellular receptors tingle as they begin to convert solar energy into heat and vitamin D to fuel my biochemical machine so that I can pound keys laid on top of a circuit board causing a complete circuit to form and telling the electronic brain, housed inside this plastic shell, to output a specific series of Ones and Zeros onto specific pixels to display to me the character that was recently pressed by my finger-tip, and,  subsequently, fill in this blank form used to upload a text document onto the internet with a certain url that can be aimed at by any computer with the ability to receive bits of information sent out of the, seemingly, chaotic radio wave spectrum.

Not to mention the eight pounds of organic material that, theoretically, is producing the initial thought that is transmitted through a series of neural nets and synapses that travel down my arm, evoking specific muscle-groups to contract and release to allow my eyes, shoulders, back, arms, biceps, forearms, wrist, hands, and fingers to work in a harmonious cacophony of action to produce each keystroke within the set parameters of my memories recollection of what I believe to be the commonly accepted version of English that a portion of people on the world can read and comprehend enough to offer...

You get the point.

I just finished this book ("Cryptonomicon" by Neal Stephenson) and it has rattled loose a couple of old ideas in my head; most notably Platonic Ideas. 

I taught myself about them, at least three lifetimes ago (five or six years ago, but it feels like an eternity has lapsed between then and now), but had all but forgotten what they actually meant until a certain point in this book.  The book is extremely math heavy, or at least subject matter is math-heavy (he doesn't force much actual math done your throat which I appreciated.), and at one point he references Platonic Ideals and it sends me reeling.  Like a wave crashing in against the rocks of my mind I remember it all; I get what Platonic Forms/Ideas are all over again, but this time it has a tangibleness to it, a tactile feel, something I can hold on to and use like any other tool I have encountered.

This sets my mind spinning; I find myself again staring at leaves and the patterns of the trees production of them, I stare at the mold in my shower and notice an odd harmony between the halves, and then like wildfire spreading across a Californian forest, molesting and destroying everything in it's wake, it turns back onto myself. 


Using a broad brush, Platonism is, roughly, the difference between Universals and Particulars, whereas one is tangible and, theoretically, knowable, the other is lofty and unknowable. 

If you subscribe to the idea that everything in nature can be represented by a Mathematical Ideal (i.e. a string of numbers or characters that represent, implicitly, the object under scrutiny.), which I am, more often then not, inclined to ascribe to; then I myself am merely a string of mathematical computations that when totaled up, not only explain away all of my behavior, but also can, conceivably, extrapolate outward to what I might do.

Mathematically speaking, this is merely Platonism, maybe even Post-Platonism (which my memory fails me at this moment as to what is actually means), with an even more abstract concept at the heart of everything.  Whereas (to use the trite example), Plato talks about how we can see many different types of trees but we still have this broad idea of what a tree is supposed to look like, for instance; (the well read philosophers reading this will hopefully get this little homage) if presented with, let's say, a duck, and someone hands you this object that appears to be of living flesh and blood with all the normal characteristics of a duck and tells you it is a tree, most, if not all of us, would say "no, this is a duck". 

Let's try to take that idea a step backwards; you have never encountered a duck in real life, you have been told about them only from second hand accounts and have no working knowledge of what a "duck" is in-and-of-itself.  You would still posses an Idea of what a duck is and would not believe that, although, you were handed an object, and told it was a tree but did not have any of the characteristics that you have come to know as a tree, in fact, it was a tree.  Whether you necessarily equate it to that of a duck either, is a matter of conjecture that I am not prepared to delve into at this moment, but simply to state, that you have an Idea of a tree that exists outside of "actual" trees and that is this crux of Platonism.

With that out of the way, let me return to how this applies to Mathematics:

Mathematics states that everything in nature can be broken down into a string of numbers and characters that represent any given natural phenomenon.  All of nature is governed by the logical system, that I personally believe is summed up best within Peano's Postulate, that some give the header of "Physics".  All Physics is talking about is an ideal that works under given conditions, it is not necessarily always correct, but it is a median from which to start with the specifics.  Mathematics is an abstraction from the world around; it is a purely conceptual idea that exist parallel to this physical existence.  Mathematics can represent physical objects but can never, itself, be a physical object.  It is the purest example of the difference between Platonic Forms and Ideals, or Universals v Particulars.

With the next part out of the way let us enter into the home stretch, and, arguably, the hardest part; a little Quantum Mechanics:

Quantum Theory states (Quantum Theory being a sub, maybe sub sub, devision of Physics) that atoms are more likely to appear in places under observation; as if the human mind "locks" them into place when observing a given object.  If not under observation atoms have a habit of doing whatever it is they feel like doing, they do not necessarily group together to form coherent forms that are recognizable.  Atoms appear to move in a probabilistic pattern, i.e. that they could be in a given location given a period of time.

There is still mathematic proofs and formulas that, theoretically, can, at least, predict atomic movements.  This is not to forget that obviously a large group of atoms have solidified into an overall structure that many would point to and say that is a tree, or that is a duck, or that is Josh. 

Let us now begin to delve into my initial question:

If I am merely a grouping of atomic particles that move based on some sort of physics (that might not be fully understood yet, but one day, I do not doubt, will be understood), physics being an abstraction of reality that can represent any given natural phenomenon as a string of numbers and characters which can then be used to explain observable outcomes of a confluence of events, and, also used to extrapolate, at the very least, probable outcomes up other specific circumstances; am I real?

Refining the question more; am I real or am I merely a Platonic Ideal of "A Person Called Josh"?  I fear it becomes "wishy-washy" at this point (I have to revert to using Aristotelian colloquial); do I represent myself, "I" in the Freudian or Descartes sense (the "dues ex machina"), insofar that not only do I shape the reality outside of myself but also keep myself "in place" (at an atomic level) by being the Primary Observer?  Or am I (as Skinner or Newton (and to a lesser degree, Einstein) would have me be) merely a mathematical formula applying itself to other mathematical formulations and creating ripples through out the ether of "everything" (the universe, if you prefer it more)?

To bring the argument around; am "I" a Universal or a Particular?  Which implications spiral outward to; am I a free-agent or can I only choose from a "repertoire of behavior" given to a certain situation?

From a religious mindset I still offer up the abstraction of the mind-body-soul; which could just be the Catholic in me copping out of the question, just offering up some vaguely abstract concept to explain away any question that feels as though it is too big to be answered.  I do feel as though there is some merit to the idea of the soul if nothing else to argue the recently rising Quantum Mechanics question: which again is; if atoms need an observer to "stay put" but every part of me (that eight pounds of gray organic matter we call a brain is still merely atoms congealed together) is merely being held together, pardon the term but, by "the Grace of God", then who is the observer? 

Either there is a God that is observing me under a preexisting set of conditions or there is a "me" that exist outside of atoms and reality.  Either I am god or else there is a God.  My, very human, vanity would prefer the idea that I am the Primary Observer, that something within me is an abstraction from the Platonic Forms, that within me lies something that exist parallel to the physical world that is constantly aware of the world around me and, in particular, always aware of my personal aspects.  I, coming from a religious household (almost say this unconsciously), believe that "I" am in possession of a soul (or more aptly: my soul is in possession of a physical representation of what some would call Josh).  Replace the word soul for anything else and the statement, at least to me, still stands; call it the Primary Mover, The Immortal Observer, The First, The Alpha, The Tao, Nirvana, whatever.  It remains though; that something has to be observing us (Mathematically speaking), which, I believe can only force people to either believe in a God or in themselves as god.